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ARGUMENT
L

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT
THE SEARCH OF BRAKE'S VEHICLE WAS JUSTIFIED UNDER
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION

The State first claims, "the outcome in Class was not dependent on the specific
features of the search in that case, but rather on the balancing of the government's
legitimate interest against the nature and extent of the intrusion entailed in the search,"
and "[t]hat balancing of interests in this case supports the court of appeals ruling
affirming the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence" (Brief of
Respondent at 10). However, Brake asserts that the facts in the present case are
distinguishable from Class and are insufficient to overcome Brake's Fourth Amendment
rights.
In New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986), the
United States Supreme Court upheld an officer's discovery of a weapon after searching
the front area of the car in order to see the VIN. Class, 475 U.S. at 118, 106 S.Ct. at
968. The Supreme Court applied a balancing test between "governmental interest in
highway safety served by obtaining the VIN" and the "concern for the officer's safety"
in finding that the search was constitutional. Class, 475 U.S. at 118, 106 S.Ct. at 968.
Specifically, the Supreme Court found that the officer's intrusion was a search
and then questioned whether this search was constitutional. Class, 475 U.S. at 115, 106
S.Ct. at 966. The Supreme Court stated:

If [Class] had remained in the car, the police would have been justified in asking
him to move the papers obscuring the VIN.... [and] that a demand to inspect the
VIN, like a demand to see license and registration papers, is within the scope of
police authority pursuant to a traffic violation stop. If respondent had stayed in
his vehicle and acceded to such a request from the officer, the officer would not
have needed to intrude into the passenger compartment.
Id, (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court declared, "out of concern for the safety of the
police...officers may...exercise their discretion to require a driver who commits a traffic
violation to exit the vehicle even though they lack any particularized reason for
believing the driver possesses a weapon." Id. The Supreme Court referred to
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-111, 98 S.Ct. 330, 332-33, 54 L.Ed.2d
331 (1977) (per curiam) [officers justified in ordering passengers out of an automobile
that has been lawfully detained pursuant to a traffic violation because "[establishing a
face-to-face confrontation diminishes the possibility, otherwise substantial, that the
driver can make unobserved movements; this, in turn, reduces the likelihood that the
officer will be the victim of an assault."] in reaching this result. Class, 475 U.S. at
115-16, 106 S.Ct. at 967. Thus, while Pennsylvania v. Mimms allowed the officers in
Class to briefly detain the respondent outside the car, the question remained whether
the officers acted within the legal bounds of the Fourth Amendment after the respondent
chose to exit the vehicle and after the officers chose to search for the VIN while the

respondent was detained outside of the vehicle because of concerns for officer safety.
Id. at 116, 106 S.Ct. at 967.
The Supreme Court concluded that allowing the respondent to return to the
vehicle to obtain the VIN would have placed the officers in danger because the
respondent would have possible access to a dangerous weapon, therefore "the search to
obtain the VIN was not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment." Id. The Supreme Court
reached this conclusion by "balancing the need to search against the invasion which the
search entails." Id. (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court observed that when, as in this case, "the officer's safety is
less directly served by the detention, something more than objectively justifiable
suspicion is necessary to justify the intrusion if the balance is to tip in favor of the
legality of the governmental intrusion." Id. at 117, 106 S.Ct. at 967. The Supreme
Court noted that in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 107, 98 S.Ct. at 331, "the
officers had personally observed the seized individual in the commission of a traffic
offense before requesting that he exit the vehicle." Class, 475 U.S. at 117, 106 S.Ct. at
968. And in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 693, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 2589, 69
L.Ed.2d 340 (1981), "the officers had obtained a warrant to search the house that the
person seized was leaving when they came upon him." Class, 475 U.S. at 117, 106
S.Ct. at 968.
Thus, the Supreme Court relied upon the following three factors in order to
determine whether the officer's search for the VIN justified a balancing of

governmental interests against the governmental intrusion: "[T]he safety of the offices
was served by the governmental intrusion; the intrusion was minimal; and the search
stemmed from some probable cause focusing suspicion on the individual affected by the
search." Id. at 117-18, 106 S.Ct. at 968.
The Supreme Court held that the officer's probable cause was satisfied because
he "directly observ[ed] respondent commit a violation of the law." Id. at 118, 106
S.Ct. at 968.
The Supreme Court further held that the "particular method of obtaining the VIN
here was justified by a concern for the officers' safety." Id. This was because the
respondent in Class chose to leave the vehicle after being lawfully stopped for two
traffic violations. And the Supreme Court previously explained that if the respondent is
allowed to go retrieve the VIN himself, he would have access to the firearm, putting
the officers in harms way. Id. supra, at 115, 106 S.Ct. at 966.
And the Supreme Court finally held that the issue of the intrusiveness of the
search was justified for the following reasons:
The search was focused in its objective and no more intrusive than necessary to
fulfill that objective,... [i.e] little more intrusive than a demand that respondent under the eyes of the officers - move 1he papers himself. The VIN, which was
the clear initial objective of the officer, is by law present...in plain view of
someone outside the automobile [and so] not subject to a reasonable expectation
of privacy....The officer did not root about the interior of respondent's

automobile before proceeding to examine the VIN. He did not reach into any
compartments or open any containers. He did not even intrude into the interior
at all until after he had checked the doorjamb for the VIN. When he did intrude,
the officer simply reached directly for the unprotected space where the VIN was
collated to move the offending papers.
Id. at 118-19, 106 S.Ct. at 968 (citations omitted).
The facts in Class are clearly distinguishable from and not analogous to the facts
in the present case. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion that the
warrantless search of Brake's car was justified under the Fourth Amendment.
In Class, the officers were justified in conducting a limited search (removing
papers from the dash in order to see the VIN) only after the respondent's Fourth
Amendment interests were overcome by "something more than objectively justifiable
suspicion necessary to justify the intrusion...." Class, 475 U.S. at 117, 106 S.Ct. at
967.
Under the facts of the present case, Brake asserts that Class is not analogous to
this case and that Castleberry's search was unjustified. First, unlike Class, Castleberry
did not witness either of the two vehicles commit a traffic violation (R. 102: 15, 30).
In fact, as Castleberry approached the two vehicles, he merely wanted to know
"whether or not they needed assistance" (R. 102: 15, 30). The State claims that Class
is analogous because, as the Supreme Court found, police are exposed to generalized
danger inherent in traffic stops (Brief of Respondent at 10, 11). However, Castleberry

did not stop Brake or the other vehicle's driver pursuant to a traffic violation.
Castleberry approached the two legally parked vehicles to offer assistance (R. 102: 15).
Thus, there was no inherent danger to Castleberry. Assuming that officers are always in
danger, even when they approach a vehicle to offer assistance and without the officers
seeing a violation, goes far beyond the Supreme Court's recognition of the generalized
danger inherent in traffic stops and would grant officers authority to direct the
movements of a driver "even though they lack any particularized reason for believing
the driver" had violated the law. See Class, 475 U.S. at 115, 106 S.Ct. at 967.
However, the State asserts that Castleberry was justifiably concerned for his
safety merely because he approached two vehicles to offer them help in an isolated
area, there was an underage girl in the driver's seat in Brake's car, it was dark and the
vehicles' windows were foggy, there was a total of five individuals in the two cars, and
Brake's purse was not under his control (Brief of Respondent at 15).
Why an underage girl sitting in the driver's seat is a justifiable concern for an
officer's safety, Brake cannot say. But the mere fact that there were five teenagers out
after 11:00 p.m. in two legally parked vehicles is not indicia of inherent danger.
Moreover, the persons in the vehicles did nothing suspect to arouse Castleberry's
suspicion that he was in possible danger. There was no testimony that the occupants
refused to answer Castleberry's questions or that they were engaged in other suspicious
behavior that would alert a reasonable officer's attention to possible danger. The
opposite is true. It is evident that all occupants were cooperating with Castleberry.

Furthermore, the fact that Castleberry did not even call for backup until he found what
he believed was cocaine in Brake's vehicle is evidence that he really was not concerned
about his safety and only called for backup to proceed with the possible drug
investigation (R. 61). Thus, Castleberry had no particularized concern for his safety.
Second, unlike Class, Castleberry lacked probable cause to search Brake's
vehicle on the assumption that Brake may have committed a traffic violation; therefore
Castleberry's search was unjustified. The State argues that the Court of Appeals'
decision was correct because, applying Class, the Court of Appeals' finding that
Castleberry found an "underage and unlicensed driver behind the wheel of a car that he
believed was running, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-8-1(1)" and that this
violation justified Castleberry in asking for Brake's drivers license "in light of the
governmental interest in removing unlicensed drivers from the road for public safety
reasons." (Brief of Respondent at 13; internal citations omitted). In light of these
claims, the State further argues that the Court of Appeals' decision was correct because
"Castleberry's authority to access defendant's license was fully comparable to the
authority of officer in Class to view the VIN." (Brief of Respondent at 14; internal
citation omitted).
There are several problems with the State's claims. One, the Court of Appeals
misconstrued the record and declared that Brake's vehicle was running. See State v.
Brake, 2002 UT App 190, 1123-24, 51 P.3d 31, 35. Castleberry testified that he did
not know whether Brake's car was running (R. 102: 29). Moreover, the State admits in

its Brief that Castleberry "could not be sure that defendant's car was also running.v
(Brief of Respondent at 13, n.4).
Not only was there insufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause
that Brake's car was running, but there was insufficient evidence to conclude that Brake
violated any traffic law. When Castleberry approached Brake's green Nissan, he found
an underage girl sitting in the driver's seat (R. 102: 31). Castleberry asked the
vehicle's occupants what they were doing and was informed that they were sitting and
talking (R. 102: 31). Castleberry then went to the driver's side rear and "opened the
door to be able to speak with [Brakel" and asked her why the underage girl was sitting
in the driver's seat (R. 102: 16-17, 32-33). Brake informed Castleberry that she had
driven the vehicle to its present location and that the underage girl sat in the driver's
seat after their arrival (R. 102: 17, 33). Supporting Brake's testimony is the fact that
Castleberry testified that the windows were fogged, indicating that the vehicle's
occupants had been parked for a length of time (R. 102: 16).
As there was insufficient probable cause that Brake's car was running, the Court
of Appeals erroneously concluded "that it was both justifiable and reasonable... 'in light
of the governmental interest in removing unlicensed drivers from the road for public
safety reasons.'" Brake, 2002 UT App 190, at 1f23.
The next problem with the State's claim is that although a demand to inspect the
VIN is akin to a demand to see license and registration papers, the Supreme Court in
Class held that this demand is "within the scope of police authority pursuant to a traffic

stop" Class, 475 U.S. at 115, 106 S.Ct. at 966 (emphasis added). Again, Castleberry
did not "stop" either of the two vehicles. He found both of them legally parked and
approached them to offer assistance (R. 102: 15). Therefore, Brake asserts that the
State is incorrect that Castleberry's authority "was fully comparable to the authority of
[the] officer in Class to view the VIN." (Brief of Respondent at 14).
Even if Castleberry had authority to request and see Brake's identification,
which Brake does not concede, Castleberry was not justified in searching Brake's car
for her purse and weapons. After Castleberry determined that Brake was the owner of
the vehicle, he then asked for Brake's identification, which she replied that it was in her
purse in the front seat and she offered to retrieve it (R. 102: 17, 34-35). Instead of
accepting Brake's offer, Castleberry searched the front area of the vehicle for the purse
and weapons without a warrant and without Brake's permission while Brake and the
other occupants were still in the vehicle (R. 102: 18, 36).
Under Class, Castleberry's search was not justified. In Class, the Supreme
Court specifically stated that it was within the authority of the officers to ask the
respondent himself to remove the papers in order to see the VIN while the respondent
was in the vehicle. See Class, 475 U.S. at 115, 106 S.Ct., at 966. Class dictates that
Castleberry should have allowed Brake to retrieve her identification herself instead of
conducting a warrantless search of the vehicle with Brake and others still in the car.
And third, unlike Class, Castleberry asserted that he was concerned for his
safety and searched the vehicle looking for weapons (R. 102: 17-18, 35-36). This is

not analogous to Class for two reasons: 1) Utah case law requires an officer conduct a
search for weapons only if he "reasonably believes a suspect is dangerous and may
obtain immediate control of weapons." State v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 870 (Utah
App. 1992), and 2) Class requires "When an officer's safety is less directly served by
the detention, something more than objectively justifiable suspicion is necessary to
justify the intrusion if the balance is to tip in favor of the legality of the governmental
intrusion." Class, 475 U.S. at 117, 106 S.Ct. at 967.
The Court of Appeals ignored both the distinguishing facts of this case and prior
Utah case law concerning the search of the interior of a vehicle for weapons in the
course of an investigatory stop. See Brake, 2002 UT App 190, at ft28-31 (Orme, j .
dissenting). Because Castleberry did not see any weapons nor did he observe any
behavior by the vehicle occupants which would have alerted a reasonable person's
suspicions of danger, the facts in this case are not analogous to Class. Id.
Moreover, Class requires "When a search or seizure has as its immediate object
a search for a weapon...we have struck the balance to allow the weighty interest in the
safety of police officers to justify warrantless searches based only on a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity." Class, 434 U.S. at 117, 106 S.Ct. at 967 (citing Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) [police officer justified in
conducting limited pat down search for weapons for officer safety after reasonable
belief pursuant to specific and articulable facts of possible crhninal behavior]).
However, as the circumstances surrounding Castleberry's search in this case are

completely dissimilar to the facts in Terry, Class requires and the State agrees that the
standard is "something more than objectively justifiable suspicion" when an officer
intrudes on a person's Fourth Amendment Rights. See Class, 434 U.S. at 117, 106
S.Ct. at 967; Brief of Respondent at 11-12.
Castleberry asserted that he searched Brake's car in order to retrieve the purse
and make sure there were no weapons (R. 102: 17-18, 35-36). In order to search for
weapons, either the safety of the officer must be in question or there must be something
more than "an objectively justifiable suspicion" to conduct the search. See Id. As
shown above, Castleberry was not authorized to search the vehicle for Brake's purse or
for weapons out of a concern for safety. The circumstances of this case clearly did not
amount to a legitimate concern for officer safety.
Thus, Castleberry lacked probable cause to conduct the search for Brake's purse
and for weapons. Accordingly, Brake asserts that the Court of Appeals erroneously
concluded that the warrantless search was justified under the Fourth Amendment.

n.

STATE V. JAMES SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSION THAT THE
SEARCH OF BRAKE'S VEHICLE WAS NOT JUSTIFIED UNDER
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION

The State argues that State v. James, 2000 UT 80, 13 P.3d 576, supports the
Court of Appeals' decision that Castleberry's warrantless search of Brake's vehicle was
justified (Brief of Respondent at 16). However, Brake asserts that the State disregards

"the fundamental distinction between detention and questioning of [respondent] himself
(a procedure specifically authorized by Mimms) and a search for physical items of
evidence not in plain view, such as narcotics or firearms." James, 2000 UT 80, atfl2.
The facts and outcome in James are inapposite to this case. In James, an officer
received a citizen's tip that the respondent was driving a dark-colored pickup truck and
"was all over the road" and had "hit or ... almost struck" three other vehicles. Id. at
f2. The officer obtained the license plate number and tracked down the respondent's
address. Id. The officer proceeded to defendant's home and observed the truck
matching the citizen's description enter in the driveway where it stopped. Id. The
officer then approached the truck's driver's-side door and opened the door and asked
the respondent to get out of the truck. Id. at t T s 2-3. Once the respondent opened the
door, the officer saw a 12-pack of beer on the passenger-side floor with one can open.
Id. at ^[3. Ultimately, James failed a filed sobriety test and was arrested. Id. at %4.
The State argued before this Court on certiorari and this Court agreed "that where an
officer has the right to order a person to temporarily leave a vehicle, the officer's mere
opening of a vehicle door cannot constitute an illegal search." Id. at f7. In reaching
this conclusion, however, this Court clearly distinguishes between opening a vehicle
door in the context of an investigative detention versus a search for physical evidence
such as narcotics and firearms. Class, 2002 UT 80 at t f 11-13.
The State attempts to analogize the fact that the officer in James testified at the
suppression hearing that "he had some concerns for his safety [as he approached

respondent's truck] due to the high profile of the truck, which prevented him from
observing what was taking place in the cab of the truck below his line of vision." Id. at
13, n. 1. However, it is readily apparent that the officer in James only opened the door
of the respondent's truck and asked the respondent to get out of the truck. See Id. at
11's 2-3. At no point did the officer conduct a search for weapons as Castleberry did
in the present case. Id. (R. 102: 17-18, 35-36).
The State further attempts to apply the facts in James to this case because "this
Court rejected the argument that the officer's opening the door of James' truck to make
contact with him was tantamount to a search for physical evidence" (Brief of
Respondent at 17). Again, however, at no point did the officer in James search the
respondent's truck for weapons or other physical evidence, unlike Castleberry in the
present case. Id. at 11's 2-3, (R. 102: 17-18, 35-36).
And finally, the State attempts to apply the facts and outcome in James to this
case, claiming that because Castleberry was justified in opening the back door to
question Brake, he was also justified in opening the front door to question Brake and
that the Court of Appeals' decision in Brake was justified because Castleberry observed
the bindle in plain view (Brief of Respondent at 17). Brake asserts that this reasoning is
disingenuous. In James, the officer saw the alcohol in plain view after he opened the
respondent's door and asked him to get out. James, 2000 UT 80, at 13. The officer did
not conduct a search of the vehicle. Id, In the present case, it is evident from the
record that Castleberry did not observe the bindle when he opened the back-door to

speak with Brake (R. 102: 17-18, 35-36). It was only after Castleberry was in Brake's
vehicle searching for her purse as part of a weapons search that he observed the bindle
(R. 102: 17-18, 35-36). Even the State admits in a footnote that "Castleberry did
indicate that it was not until he was inside the vehicle that he saw the bindle" (Brief of
Respondent at 17, n.8).
In fact, this Court in James specifically addressed this last claim made by the
State and distinguished between lawful investigative detention and questioning of
individuals compared to lawful searches of vehicles for weapons. See James, 2000 UT
80, atf 13. This Court observed,
In this case, [the officer] was investigating James himself, and was not searching
James's vehicle. Causing the door to be opened in some manner was a
reasonable and practical means for obtaining compliance with [the officers]
authority to lawfully require James to step from the vehicle. As such, the
opening of the door was an incidental factor in the investigation of James's
impaired physical condition, and not an independent search of the vehicle.
Id. at ^13. It is evident that the facts in this case are clearly distinguishable from
James. Accordingly, because Castleberry searched Brake's car for weapons without
probable cause and exigent circumstances, James supports the conclusion that
Castleberry's search was not justified. See Id. (citing State v. Larocco, 749 P.2d 460,
469-71 (1990) (prohibiting warrantless search of vehicles in the absence of probable

cause and exigent circumstances); see also State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1236-37
(1996) (reciting and applying Larocco rule to search of vehicle for contraband)).
Next, the State asserts that Castleberry's search of Brake's vehicle was not a
search for weapons (Brief of Respondent at 19). In fact, the State claims "the deputy in
this case did not conduct a weapons search," relying on the Court of Appeals' decision
in Brake (Brief of Respondent at 19-20, emphasis in original). This claim goes against
the clear weight of evidence and the plain testimony of Castleberry himself.
Castleberry testified repeatedly that he opened the front door on the passenger side "to
retrieve the purse so that [he] could hand it to her, make sure that there weren't any
weapons" (R. 102: 17-18, 35-36). Further, the State admits in its Statement of Facts
that Castleberry searched Brake's vehicle to "mak[e] sure that there were not any
weapons around the purse. Deputy Castleberry specifically stated that he did not want
anyone else reaching into the area of the purse without his control" (Brief of
Respondent at 5). Moreover, the State claims repeatedly that Castleberry searched the
car because he was concerned for his safety (Brief of Respondent at 8-20).
It is obvious that the search of Brake's vehicle was in fact a search for weapons.
Thus, this warrantless search was unjustified because Castleberry "did not see any
weapons, nor does the record suggest he observed any furtive movements or other
conduct consistent with the retrieval or presence of a weapon [before he searched the
car]." Brake, 2002 UT App 190, at \5\ (Orme, j . dissenting). Moreover, because an
officer may only conduct a weapons search if he "reasonably believes a suspect is

dangerous and may obtain immediate control of weapons," Bradford, 839 P.2d at 870,
this search was not justified because "nothing about a motorist possibly needing
assistance, or even underage driving, by its very nature suggests the presence of
weapons." Brake, 2002 UT App 190, at 132 (Orme, j . dissenting).
Accordingly, Brake asks this Court to overturn the legal conclusion of the Court
of Appeals that the warrantless search was juslified under the Fourth Amendment on
grounds that it was minimal intrusion supported by reasons of "officer safety".

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in the original brief, Brake asks
this Court to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and that this matter be
remanded to the Fourth District Court with instructions that her plea is to be
withdrawn, the evidence suppressed, and the matter dismissed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of September, 2003.

^^'l^/t
Margaret E/Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant

S(.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant to the Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor, P.O.
Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 17th day of September, 2003.

7
Margaret P. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant

7^

